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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the effect of ownership structure of listed banks in Kenya on their dividend 
payout policy. The theoretical frmne7.uork of this study is based on dividend relevance theon;, 
dividend irrelevance theory and agency theory. The study explains ownership tr;pes such as-: 
government ownership, institutional ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership and 
managerial ownership in relation to the impact they have on the dividend policy of listed banks in 
Kenya . 
The relationship between dividend payout ratios will be tested against ownership structures with 
control variables like return on assets, price to book value, size of the firm, age of the firm and debt 
to equity ratio being used. Past studies in Kenya have not addressed the impact ownership 
structure has on dividend payout policy of listed banks in Kenya. Since most portfolio managers 
use bank stocks to get exposure to a market, thus bank stocks are in high demand, this provides 
incentive to focus on banking sector in Kenya. Findings of the study could be used by investors 
and owners of banks to better their understanding of dividend payout policies and investor 
decisions . 
KEY WORDS: Ownership structure, divined payout, dividend yield, banks, Kenya. 
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Dividend payment policy is especially important in corporate governance. Why do firms 
pay dividends? The answer to this question has paved way for numerous research studies 
all around the world. This has had an impact on the shareholders of companies, 
reinvestment opportunities, growth and valuation of companies, agency relationships, 
and corporate governance. Dividend payout policy is a common and useful tool in 
reducing the conflict of interests between the shareholders and managers (Jensen G. G., 
1992)because on one hand shareholders are interested in getting dividends while 
managers seek to retain and reinvest earnings. Hence the question, what is the effect of 
ownership sh·ucture on dividend payout policy of a bank is and its significance 
Moreover, ownership structure is of great importance in any organization. This 
particularly so because power lies within ownership. Ownership structure is defined by 
distribution of equity with regard to votes and capital, but also by the identity of equity 
owners. The distribution of ownership in a bank structure has major importance in 
corporate governance because it determines the incentives of managers and they manage 
the economic efficiency of the corporations. (Meckling, 1976). 
Through corporate governance, the shareholder aims to maximize value by ensuring that 
corporate policies are in favor of their interests; as stated earlier, ownership as a 
shareholder is an instrument of power. From this very fact, stems the agency-principal 
conflict. The challenge for directors and managers then becomes whether the profit an 
institution earns should be distributed in form of dividends to shareholders or retained 
as investments for the institution. Dividend payment is necessary for both managerial 
personnel and investors, as managers have to decide about the amount and timing and 
investors have to decide for making decision on their investment portfolio. (Ilyal, Hider, 
& Haq, 2016) 
(Jensen, 1986) And (Rozeff, 1982)argued that firms can alleviate agency problems using 
dividend payout policy. In addition (Rozeff, 1982) model of optimal level of dividends, 
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argues that the optimal level of dividends is a trade-off between higher dividends which 
lowers agency costs. According to them, if dividends are not paid to shareholders, 
managers will capitalize on the profits generated for their private benefits. Dividend 
policy assists companies to identify how they can conh·ol agency costs by handling 
dividend policy. (Jensen, 1986) Argued that by paying dividends to the shareholders, the 
managerial control over the resources would reduce. (Stouraitis & Wu, 2004) Suggested 
that the dividend could be used to squeeze the overinvestment problems of corporations. 
However, the importance of dividend payout policy is not limited to reducing agency 
costs only; it plays a big role in informing investor decisions thus the Signaling effect. An 
announcement of an increase in dividend payout is taken very positively in the market 
as it is taken to be an indication of better growth and stability in the future. Thus the 
dividends paid per share can give information to shareholders and investors on the firm's 
valuation. Dividend payout policy can be influenced by ownership structures of a firm. 
Consequently, this study seeks to investigate what impact the ownership structure of 
listed banks in Kenya have on their dividend payout policy. (Carvalhal-da-Silva & Leal, 
2004) Contended that ownership structure is a crucial and fundamental factor in 
determining the efficiency of the market by providing more information about the extent 
of risk diversification of shareholders and the occurring agency problems. 
This research will link the bank's dividend payout policies with ownership structure of 
the listed banks in Kenya by providing statistical evidence. Listed banks in Kenya have 
various types of ownership in their governance. As a result, this study will focus on 
particular forms of ownership which include: institutional ownership, foreign ownership 
and government ownership. The purpose of the paper is to identify the relationship 
between dividend policy and managerial ownership, institutional ownership, foreign 
ownership and government ownership from published financial statements and annual 
reports of Kenyan banks. Narrowing down the study to the banking sector will prove to 
be different because not only has it been conducted mostly in developed counh·ies but 
also there has not been an identical research study done in Kenya. 
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The choice of having listed banks as the sample of study for this research was influenced 
by the fact that banks in Kenya are an important sector that provides a critical service of 
financing enterprises and transforming risk. Every single industry in the country is linked 
by the banking system. Therefore it only seems logical to have banks as the representation 
of other sectors in the counh-y; furthermore, the required data from this banks is available 
following the banking regulations in Kenya. 
The paper has been divided in to various parts. The chapter one inh·oduces the topic, the 
objectives and the relevance of the topic. Chapter two, part gives a framework of the topic 
based on past literature and studies done on the subject. Past studies have contented 
different hypotheses and developed these hypotheses based on different theories and 
empirical researches. Chapter three explains the methodology of the study explaining the 
sample size, data collection methodology, models and variables definition. Chapter four 
explains the analysis of the research data where descriptive statistics tests, correlation 
tests, Tobit and logit regression tests have used. In the last chapters, the conclusion and 
recommendation have been provided. 
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Problem Statement 
In the Kenyan market, there are institutional investors and individual investors who 
invest in banking stocks with a need for dividends. However some of these investors may 
not have a direct impact on how the dividend policy of their respective bank is set; 
instead, it is the major shareholders who own the bank that have the controlling power 
to alter dividend policy. In addition, many portfolio managers use banking stocks to get 
market exposure to sectors that do not have a direct route for exposure. It is therefore 
important to establish to what extent ownership sh·ucture affects dividend policy; the 
major shareholders have the power and intent to design the dividend policy in such a 
manner that it favors their interests most. 
This research will establish the impact the different ownership types of listed banks have 
on their dividend policies, which is still unexplored in the emerging Kenyan market. The 
results obtained will be useful for different investors depending on their investor needs 
and help bank stakeholders better understand the dynamics of dividend policy in banks. 
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Research objectives 
1. Investigate whether there is a positive or negative relationship between ownership 
structure and dividend payout ratio of listed banks in Kenya. 
Research question 
1. What impact does ownership structure have on dividend policy of listed banks in 
Kenya? 
Hypotheses 
H1o: There exists a negative relationship between foreign ownership and dividend policy 
of banks. 
H1a: There does not exist a negative relationship between foreign ownership and 
dividend policy of banks. 
H2o: There exists a negative relationship between managerial ownership and dividend 
policy of banks. 
H2a: There does not exist a negative relationship between managerial ownership and 
dividend policy of banks. 
H3o: There exists a positive relationship between government ownership and dividend 
policy of banks. 
H3a: There does not exist a positive relationship between government ownership and 
dividend policy of banks. 
H4o: There exists a positive relationship between institutional ownership and dividend 
policy of banks. 
H4a: There does not exist a positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
dividend policy of banks. 
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Significance of the study 
This study seeks to investigate how significant ownership sh·ucture is to the dividend 
policy of banks. Similar studies have almost exclusively been conducted in developing 
counh·ies. The information from this study could be of great use to investors as well as 
current bank owners in an effort to comprehend and enhance their dividend payout 
policies and financing decisions. The results obtained will be useful to the 
aforementioned institutional and individual investors in future to identify banks with a 
higher risk of susceptibility to conflicts of interest and agency costs and how this might 
significantly affect their liquidity needs. Moreover, the presence of government 
ownership may loosen or tighten dividend policy and the natural high leverage of banks 
suggests a high dividend payout as owners have a smaller stake in overall operations. 
Contribution and target audience 
Furthermore, this study also aims to make more theoretical conh·ibutions to the field of 
finance research since almost but not all previous research on the same has been carried 
out in developed countries outside Africa. There appears to be no consistent relationship 
between the ownership sh·ucture and dividend policies in the findings of previous 
studies in the wide range of frameworks they have been conducted in. By exploring this 
field in the banking sector in Kenya, the inferences of this study will be of importance for 
further research to draw comparisons with results from other studies on the topic, in 
different geographical, economic and political settings. As a result, this paper is directed 
primarily at a Kenyan and international audience within the finance research field as well 




This section seeks to develop the research hypothesis and gives a further understanding 
of the field of study under which the topic lies. This includes the main theories and pillar 
stones related to dividends and dividend policies of banks as well as ownership structure. 
The main theories discussed in this section for dividends are the irrelevance and 
relevance theory, agency theory, dividend signaling and the underpinning of banks in 
Kenya. For ownership structure, banks in Kenya are grouped into different categories 
according the majority shareholder; a conceptual framework will be offered to give more 
insight. 
Dividends and dividend theories 
Earnings dish·ibuted to shareholders are called dividends (M, 2004). In Kenya, among 
other factors shareholders and the board of directors devise the dividend policies of 
banks; therefore, they have the power to increase the amount of dividend as declared by 
directors or to reduce. Profits made by corporation like a bank can either be reinvested 
into acquiring more depositors or be distributed as dividend to stockholders. Each bank 
formulates its own policies as regards dividend. This mostly is determined by many 
factors and conditions prevailing during that period. Many corporations retain part of 
their earnings for capitalization purpose while pay the remainder as dividend. 
Researchers have provided considerable attention and thought to solve dividend puzzle 
resulting in number of conflicting hypothesis theories and explanations (Al-Kuwari, 
2009). Most researchers have focused on developed markets like the USA, Britain, Japan 
etc. with little or no attention placed on developing or less developed economies. 
The findings of the developed economies may not be directly applied to developing 
economies like Kenya due to differences in regulations, culture environment and nature 
of investors. Many dividend theories have been advanced and tend to explain how 
dividend decisions are arrived at and whether they have an impact on the value of a firm. 
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Dividend irrelevance theory 
Relevance on dividends' effect on firm value has been an issue of contention among 
scholars since the research in the field commenced. The theories on dividend policy has 
essentially two opposing schools of thought: on one hand, the thought that dividend 
policy is irrelevant to the value of the firm and on the other hand, that it is indeed 
relevant. The dividend irrelevancy theory's main advocates are also its founders, Franco 
Modigliani and Merton Miller. (Miller, 1961) Theorized and modelled that investors' 
valuation of a firm should be unaffected by and irrespective of its dividend policy under 
the following assumptions: 
1. Perfect capital markets where no single investor is large enough to affect the 
equilibrium by trading, there is no difference in taxation between capital gains and 
dividends, all investors have equal and costless access to information and there 
are no h·ansaction costs. 
2. Rational behavior where investors will always choose the option that maximizes 
their wealth and have no preference for earnings distributed either as cash 
dividends or capital gains. 
3. Perfect certainty where all investors have full assurance of the future investment 
policy as well as future profits of every corporation. Due to this assumption, there 
is no need to distinguish between stocks and bonds as sources of funds . 
4. Should firms have paid too much in dividends, they can raise new capital by 
issuing new stock with no cost. 
Dividend relevance theory 
The main opponents of the dividend irrelevance theory argue that the assumptions made 
in the dividend irrelevance theory are too unrealistic. Such ideality cannot exist in the 
real markets. According to this line of thought, there are in reality no circumstances under 
which assumptions such as a world free of taxes and transaction costs, perfect 
information is available to everyone, where all investors behave rationally and in the 
same manner and so forth, exists. Therefore, Miller & Modigliani' s theory of dividend 
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irrelevance has no practical relevance since it cam1ot occur. The main schools of thought 
were developed by (Lintner J., 1962), (Gordon, 1963) and (JE, 1963)in response to Miller 
& Modigliani' s findings. 
The bird-in-the-hand theory was developed by (Lintner J. , 1962) and (Gordon, 
1963)independently of each other but both arrived at the same results. The theory 
contends that, dividends are relevant because some investors prefer dividends over 
capital gains. This is because dividends generate definite cash returns today while capital 
gains are generated over a longer period of time in the future and can be unpredictable. 
This theory also takes taxes into consideration and states that taxes have implications on 
dividend policy. On one hand, dividends and capital gains are taxed differently in some 
countries (this is the case in Kenya) which may affect dividend policy. On the other hand, 
capital gains allows the individual investor to defer capital gains tax to another desired 
period. This is not possible for dividends, as the dividend policy is controlled by the 
company and taxes need to be paid for the period in which dividends are received. 
According to this line of thought, the yield of a stock has an inverse relationship to the 
dividend payout ratio in relatively higher dividend payouts. However, investors prefer 
dividends over capital gains and thus a h·ade-o££ arises in regard to dividend yield. 
(JE, 1963) Refined the dividend relevance theory further by creating a model which states 
that dividends are relevant to the value of a firm. In his model, the important factor is the 
rate at which the investor can reinvest the dividends paid in relation to the return that 
the firm can generate on retained earnings. If the investors' reinvestment rate is higher 
than the return rate of the projects in which the firm can reinvest the retained earnings, 
the firm should distribute all its earnings as dividends. 
Underpinning of Banks in Kenya 
After independence (1963), the number of commercial banks operating in Kenya 
increased as both local and foreign owned banks entered the banking scene. These 
banks basically make money by lending money at rates higher than the money they pay 
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back to their depositors. More specifically, banks collect interest on loans and interest 
payments from the debt securities they own, and pay interest on deposits and short-term 
borrowings. Therefore, depositors are fundamental for the successful operation of banks. 
This begs the question, to whom should more importance be given, stakeholders like 
depositors or shareholders? 
Who owns the banks in Kenya? The Banking Act imposes single shareholder limits such 
that no one is permitted to hold, directly or indirectly, or otherwise have a beneficial 
interest in more than 25% of the share capital of any banking institution. However, these 
restrictions do not apply to: 
• Other banking institution. 
• The Kenyan government or the government of a foreign owned state. 
• A state corporation within the meaning of the state corporations act. 
• A foreign company licensed to carry on the business of a banking institution in its 
corporation. 
The framework below provides an illush·ation of ownership of banks in Kenya with 
respect to shareholders. In addition, a shareholder with more than 5% of the share capital 
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Development Bank of Kenya Ltd 
National Bank of Kenya Ltd 
(3) 
Prior to 2015, Kenya's banking sector was observed as a vibrant, highly profitable sector, 
with industry Return on Equity's averaging north of 20%. Sector loan book grew at an 
impressive CAGR of 16% between 2011 to 2015 on the back of high economic growth and 
low financial inclusion. As at 2015, Kenya's private sector credit to GDP was 35%,lower 
than Sub-Saharan Africa's average of 46% and the global average of 129% (Cytom1, 2016). 
The sector was also characterized by increased adoption of technology and usage of 
alternative channels which enabled aggressive banks to tap into the unbanked population 
efficiently, thereby boosting margins and overall profitability. 
11 
Considering low rates of financial inclusion, the sector's potential to grow remains high. 
However, following various developments in the banking sector over the past two years, 
expectations on the future outlook of the sector have also changed much. Following the 
changes In Central Bank leadership mid-2015, the sector has seen 3 banks collapse which 
resulted to low consumer confidence in the sector and overall strength of the sector. This 
deteriorated further after the inh·oduction of the interest rate cap in August 2016, which 
is expected to lower interest margins and result in slower credit growth. Non-performing 
loans have also increased across the sector from an indush·y average of 5.2% before 2015 
to an average of 7.9% as at September 2016, mainly ath·ibuted to a challenging business 
environment and enhanced supervision by the Central Bank. Consequently, banking 
sector valuations have gone down significantly, with industry P /B declining from 1.9x 
as at the end of 2014 to 0.8x as at the end of January 2017. (Cytonn, 2016) 
These factors make the banking sector industry in Kenya a point of interest. Should banks 
focus more on pleasing the main stakeholders (depositors) by reinvesting profits for more 
growth or the shareholders by issuing dividends? What influence do the shareholders 
have on creating the dividend policy of a bank? In an effort to answer this questions and 
achieve the perfect balance, agency conflicts arise between managers and shareholders of 
these banks. Hence the importance of the agency theory and dividend signaling theory. 
Agency theory 
The dividend irrelevance theory indicates that the managers and shareholders are 
without any conflicts, however, this statement can be questioned since the owners and 
management are separate entities. The conflict arises when managers and the 
shareholders act in their own interest without considering the other part in the conflict. 
Managers may not always adopt a dividend policy that is value-maximizing for 
shareholders but would choose a dividend policy that maximizes their own private 
benefits. Therefore, the relevance of agency costs incurred by shareholders is necessary 
in order to monitor the behavior of the managers and is an implied cost related to the 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. The decision to pay out 
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dividends can reduce this types of conflicts and also the agency problem by resh·icting 
the available conditional funds to managers (Rozeff, 1982). 
In order to examine the agency problem effects on dividend policy, (La Porta, 2000) 
created two agency models of dividends. The first considers the possibility that dividend 
payout is a result of efficient legal protection, especially for shareholders, which allow · 
small shareholders to obtain dividend payments from the firms insiders. The second 
model contends that dividends is a replacement of effective legal protection which 
increases the reputation of the firm when it comes to treating investors in environments 
that are highly unprotected. This is done by using different dividend policies (La Porta, 
2000) 
Dividend signaling theory 
Dividends have been proven to be a strong indicator of firm management's views of the 
firm's future prospects and thus convey information to investors. The Miller & 
Modigliani theorem does not hold in reality since the assumptions made in the model are 
too unTealistic. (Lintner J. , 1956)Presented an alternative approach to the dividend 
irrelevance theory where the assumption that all investors have perfect access to all 
information was relaxed and thus that managers possess inside information. He found 
that firms are reluctant to change dividend policies unless they are certain that the new 
level is sustainable over a longer time horizon. Firms are reluctant to reduce their 
dividends as this signals that managers perceive the future prospects to be poor which 
will have a negative impact on investors' valuation, i.e. the share price, of the firm. 
Reversely, increasing dividends signals that managers expect a positive shift in longer 
term earnings. As a result, common practice among firms is to smooth dividend payouts 
over time and thus decrease the volatility of dividends, thereby limiting shocks to the 
share price caused by dividend announcements. (Michaely, 2006)Studied the reasons 
behind why firms follow this behavior and found that public firms were more prone to 
smoothing dividends than private firms. They concluded that the reason behind this was 
related to the scrutiny of public capital markets and traditional financial frictions 
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(Michaely, 2006) and (Ross, 1997) also found that managerial incentive schedules and 
decisions on financial structure signal information to investors about the managers' 
perceptions of the firm's future prospects. The author also found that leverage increases 
the value of firms, since the market's perception of value is increased by leverage. 
Hypothesis development: Ownership structure's effect on dividends 
More modern research have assessed the effect that ownership structure has on dividend 
payments mostly to companies on general without narrowing down to banks, but in 
different geographical settings. Despite the uniqueness of the banking sector in terms of 
its importance and its ultimate product i.e. money, there is a lacking of extensive research 
in the banking sector in Kenya; its operations, its drivers and the power play within. This 
further justifies the need for deeper insight on the ownership structures of banks in Kenya 
and the link between that and dividend policy. 
The main findings of past studies are presented here. It becomes clear that there is no 
distinct consensus among these studies. 
(Thanatawee, 2012) Studied ownership structure's impact on dividends among 
companies in China. The findings indicate that ownership by the largest shareholder, 
ownership concentration and government ownership increase the probability of 
dividend payments while institutional ownership decreases the probability of dividend 
payments. Ownership by the largest shareholder, ownership concentration and 
government ownership increase the magnitude of dividends while ownership by 
institutional ownership and foreign investors decrease the magnitude of dividends 
(Thanatawee, 2012). 
(Thanatawee, 2012) Also made a similar study but in the setting of Thailand. The findings 
suggest that higher ownership concentration and when the largest shareholder is an 
institution increases the probability of dividend payments. The findings also suggest a 
positive relationship between the size of the share held by institutional investors and the 
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magnitude of dividends. Both the likelihood and the magnitude of dividends paid 
increase (decrease) with higher institutional (individual) ownership (Thanatawee, 2012). 
In Iran, (Mehrani, 2011)findings indicate that institutional ownership, in general, has a 
negative associated with distributed dividends. However, as institutional ownership gets 
concentrated, the relationship gets inverted to a positive one. They found no statistically 
significant evidence to suggest that managerial ownership had any association with 
dish·ibuted dividends (Mehrani, 2011). 
(Afza, 2010) Presents a study which is investigated "Ownership Structure and Cash 
Flows as Determinants of Corporate Dividend Policy in Pakistan" Three years data (2005-
2007) of 100 companies listed at Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) has been analyzed. By 
using OLS regression model managerial and individual ownership, cash flow sensitivity, 
size and leverage are negative effect and operating cash-flow and profitability are 
positively related to cash dividend (Afza, 2010). 
In the same context, (Ullah H . F., 2012) conduct a study "The Impact of Ownership 
Sh·ucture on Dividend Policy Evidence from Emerging Markets KSE-100 Index Pakistan" 
to study investigates the determinants of the corporate dividend policy in the context of 
agency relation. Stepwise multiple regressions used to check the different variables of 
ownership with relation to the dividend payout policy. The study tells us that there is 
negative relationship between the managerial ownership and the dividend payout policy 
that cause the agency problem. Where there has positive relationship between the 
institutional and foreign share ownership suggested that the higher has their 
shareholdings the higher will be the firm dividend payouts. 
(Ramli, 2010) Conducts a study of "Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy: Evidence 
from Malaysian Companies". The study finds that the largest shareholder or a 
shareholder group owns around 40 percent of the company paid-up capital. Tobit 
regression results suggest if there is control of shareholder it influence thed dividend 
policy of Malaysian companies. If the shareholding higher the dividend issd also high. 
15 
But if the second ownership of shareholder is high it is also effect a positive impact on 
dividend payout policy (Ramli, 2010) 
Due to the in extensive research done on the impact of ownership structure on the 
dividend policy of banks in Kenya, this creates a huge gap that this study seeks to fill in 
the context of the Kenyan banking sector. 
Research gap 
The study to investigate the relationship between the ownership structures of banks has 
been carried out in the world and varying results have been obtained. While several 
similar studies have been conducted in mainly developing countries and different 
geographical settings, such as China (Thanatawee, 2014), Jordan (Warrad, Abed, 
Khriasat, & Al-Sheikh, 2012), India ((Kumar, 2006), Iran (Mehrani, Moradi, & Eskandar, 
2011), Italy (Mancinelli & Ozkan, 2006), and Pakistan (Ullah, 2012). 
In their study (Bjorn & Lantz, 2016)reveal institutions to be the ownership type to have 
the strongest positive influence on dividend yield, followed by sovereign wealth funds 
and banks and trusts. (B Al-Najjar, 2015) Presents consistent evidence that increasing 
ownership of foreign investors and the state in general reduces the need for paying 
dividends in the Turkish market. 
However in Kenya, previous studies that stood out were by (Ntoiti, 2013) who studied 
the relationship between ownership structures and dividend policy in the oil marketing 
industry in Kenya; she narrowed her research down to the oils sector. In addition, 
(Gitundu, Kiprop, Kibet, & E., 2016) took a different approach and investigated the 
influence of ownership structure on financial performance of privatized companies in 
Kenya. However, research focusing specifically on the banking sector is yet to be carried 
out in Kenya. This is driven by the fact that owners of the banks may influence the setting 
of dividend policy in an effort to ensure that the policy is in their best interest. Because of 
this it is important to know to what extent the extent to which owners will affect the 
dividend policy and whether this effect is negative or positive. In addition, most portfolio 
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managers use bank stocks to get exposure to a market, meaning that bank stocks are in 
high demand. The banking sector has become a crucial element of the economy in Kenya 
due to the recent interest rate cap, sh·icter banking regulations and increased financial 
inclusion amongst Kenyans. With the banking sector growth and expansion in Kenya, it 
is therefore crucial to know how the ownership sh·uctures of these banks influences their 




This study aimed at establishing how the ownership structure of listed banks in Kenya 
impacts on their dividend policy between the years 2006-2016. The study adopted a 
correlation design. A correlation analysis is concerned with how one variable or many 
variables is/ are responsible for changes in another variable. This relationship will be 
tested using a panel data analysis. A correlation analysis fits best as it helps in answering 
the question this research seeks to answer which is by how much does the dividend 
policy of banks changes due to the ownership structure. 
Population and sample of study 
The study places specific focus on the banking sector in Kenya. The population is the 42 
commercial banks; among which 12 are listed on the NSE and 30 none listed. The samples 
that were considered in the data analysis include the 12 listed banks, I&M bank was 
removed from the study sample because of missing data. This is because most investors 
invest and/ or will invest in banking stocks listed on the exchange. In addition, their data 
is available. 
Data sources 
The data required includes but is not limited to financial statements and annual reports 
of listed banks in Kenya. This data is collected from Bloomberg, Capital Markets 
Authority and individual bank websites. The data collected is yearly and runs from 2006-
2016, this period is significant as it captures the effects of the 2007 financial crisis and 2016 
interest rate cap in Kenya. 
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Variable description and measure. 
Dividend payout ratio is an indicator of a company's ability to distribute dividends 
consistently in the future as it is highly connected to the company's cash flow. Dividend 
payout ratio is used to proxy for the dependent variable as described below: 
Variable Description 
DPOUT Intensity of dividend paid; calculated as dividends per share divided by 
earnings per share. 
Table 0·1 : Dependent variables 
The following explanatory variables are used as the independent variables in the 
multivariate analysis: managerial ownership (MGRL), institutional ownership (INST), 
foreign ownership (FOREIGN), government ownership (GOVT) and other (OTHER). 
Variable Description 
MGRL Measured as the percentage of shares of the bank held by managers, 
executives, directors and their families. 
INST Measured as the percentage of shares of the bank held by the central 
government in Kenya. 
FOREIGN Measured as the percentage of shares of the bank held by foreign 
corporations, foreign financial institutions and foreign nationals. 
GOVT Measured as percentage of shares of the bank held by financial institutions 
such as banks, pension funds, investment trusts and insurers. 
OTHER Measured as percentage of shares of the bank held by other investors apart 
from those already listed above. 
Table 0-2: Independent variables 
Control variables incorporated in the model are return on assets (ROA), bank's market to 
book ratio (M/ B), return on equity (ROE), return on capital (ROC) and firm size (GRATE). 
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Working hypotheses 
1. There is a negative relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout 
of listed banks. 
2. There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and dividend 
payout of listed banks. 
3. There is a positive relationship between government ownership and dividend 
payout of banks. 
4. There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and dividend 
payout of banks. 
5. There is a positive relationship between other relationship and dividend payout 
of banks. 
Model Specification 
Since the data being tested is panel data. The study uses a panel data analysis to 
investigate the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variable while controlling for some variables. 
Hausman Testing 
Hausman test tests whether there is a significant difference between the fixed and 
random effects estimators. The random effects estimator is more efficient so we need to 
use it if the Hausman test supports it. If it does not support it, use the fixed effects model. 
The Hausman test statistic can be calculated only for the time-varying regressors. 
It represents the chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
parameters for the time-varying regressors. If the Hausman test is insignificant use the 




This section focuses solely on data analysis, presentation and interpretation. The analysis 
section consists of the descriptive statistics of the different variables used in study, the 
correlation analysis of the ownership and control variables and the last section includes 
the Hausman test and the results of the fixed effects model. 
Descriptive statistics 
Va1·iable Mean Std dev Min Max Observation 
Banknum Overall 5.5 2.886751 1 10 N=100 
Between 3.02765 1 10 n=10 
Within 0 5.5 5.5 T=10 
LNDPOUT Overall 3.359605 0.7179029 1.89385 4.609352 N=100 
Between 0.7075027 2.082485 4.201351 N=10 
Within 0.320958 2.110691 4.243045 T-bnr=10 
INST Overall 0.2889034 0.2466652 0.0201 0.8104 N=100 
Between 0.2512655 0.035244 0.75975 n=10 
Within 0.058727 0.1282834 0.5226834 T=10 
MGRL Overall 0.341565 0.2804248 0.0056 0.7389 N=100 
Between 0.2930132 0.00884 0.73862 n=10 
Within 0.0242174 0.287495 0.434185 T=10 
FRGN Overall 0.074256 0.1079579 0 0.3301 N=100 
Between 0.0995642 0 0.24879 n=10 
Within 0.0514108 -0.141534 0.225146 T=10 
GOVT Overall 0.05362 0.108374 0 0.732 N=100 
Between 0.0888944 0 0.225 n=10 
Within 0.0675359 -0.0248 -0.6833 T=10 
OTHER Overall 0.1528 0.1503726 0 0.6234 N=100 
Between 0.1524333 0 0.44956 n=10 
Within 0.0385794 0.01374 0.32664 T=10 
LnROE Overall 2.982573 0.439967 1.652497 3.639545 N=98 
Between 0.3565763 2.356618 3.292308 n=10 
Within 0.2822359 2.278452 3.620666 T-bar=9.8 
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LnBV Overall 2.946209 1.009339 0.7779937 5.001198 N=100 
Between 0.9234313 1.541429 4.191428 n=10 
Within 0.493519 1.95415 3.9359 T=10 
LnROC Overall 2.555529 0.7718328 -2.397995 3.420402 N=99 
Between 0.6288528 1.278344 3.105383 n=10 
Within 0.4822846 -1 .12081 3.452439 T=9.9 
LnGR Overall 2.481593 0.5175883 0.9015831 3.306492 N=99 
Between 0.3876494 1.855882 2.906813 n=10 
Within 0.3608389 1.355507 3.217396 T-bar=9.9 
LnROA Overall 1.051663 0.5006092 -1 .386294 1.838134 N=98 
Be hue en 0.4010456 0.4679034 1.638373 n=10 
Within 0.3261478 -o:806391 1.86886 T=9.8 
Table 4.1 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive analysis of the variables used in the study. The goal is not 
omly to calculatet the overall mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the 
variables but to go deeper and obtain the between and within variations. To understand 
the results better, keep in mind: 
• Overall variation: variation over time and individuals. 
• Between variation: variation between individual values. 
• Within variation: variation within individualvalues. 
Correlation analysis 
Table 4.2 is a correlation matrix of all the variables in the study. Negative correlations 
exist between dividend payout ratio and institutional, foreign and government 
ownership structures. Positive correlations exist between dividend payout ratio and 
managerial and other ownership structures. 
22 
Table 4.2 
DPOUT INST MGRL FRGN GOVT OTHER ROE B. VALUE ROA ROC G. RATE 
DPOUT 1 
INST -0.44661 1 
MGRL 0.449646 -0.8403 1 
FRGN -0.03379 -0.08757 -0.17986 1 
GOVT -0.15755 0.392369 -0.48413 0.004671 1 
OTHER 0.148181 -0.07187 -0.1109 -0.069 -0.12936 1 
ROE 0.351129 -0.3039 0.387227 -0.09914 -0.3221 0.299652 1 
B. VALUE -0.00482 -0.11331 0.244083 0.114066 -0.1054 -0.1474 -0.12852 1 
ROA 0.42163 -0.36439 0.286839 0.160211 -0.35174 0.490134 0.847641 -0.12603 1 
ROC 0.300445 -0.29282 0.374887 -0.18908 -0.20508 0.380412 0.90781 -0.16624 0.812638 1 
G.RATE -0.56618 0.141441 -0.0921 -0.03546 -0.14464 0.095813 0.518023 -0.09287 0.357855 0.480927 1 
The correlation matrix helps to prove the presence of correlation relationships between 
the dependent variable and the independent variable. However, this does not suffice for 
efficient and sufficient conclusions to be drawn. We go on to perfom the Hausman test 
for panel data estimation and analysis. 
Hausman testing 
Table 4.3 gives the results of the Hausman tests which is carried out on Stata to guide on 
whether to use the fixed effects model or the random effects model. 
Coefficients 
(b) Fixed (B) Random (b-B) Difference Sqrt s.e 
INST -1.760673 -1.069163 -0.6915097 0.4650309 
MGRL -1 .117973 -0.9301448 -0.1878284 1.136792 
FRGN -2.039028 -0.5780533 -1.460975 0.5965101 
GOVT 0.2577598 1.033209 -0.7754491 0.124059 
OTHER -0.8334948 -0.6621114 -0.1713834 0.7114478 
LnROE 0.827196 1.581963 -0.7547667 0.0966885 
LnBV 0.0453731 -0.0872376 0.1326107 0.0722086 
LnROC -0.3326256 -0.4917891 0.1591636 0.1451428 
LnGR -0.8569647 -1.362436 0.5054708 0.0921286 
LnROA 0.3922436 0.64531 -0.2530665 0.0436864 
Table 4.3 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
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B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)"'(-1)](b-B) 
46.72 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
(V _b-V _B is not positive definite) 
Inferences 
According to the results, b (coefficients of fixed variables) is consistent under Hoand Ha while 
B (coefficients of random variables) is inconsistent under Ho and Ha. The Chi2 obtained from 
the test is significantly small, this implies that the fixed effects coefficients and the 
random effects coefficient are significantly differents . Taking into conisderation these 
results, the study applied a fixed effects model on the panel data to analyze the effect of 
ownership structure on the dividend policy of listed banks in Kenya. 
Fixed effects modelling 
First differences model 
Table 4.4 below shows the results of the first differences model as ran on stata. The 
coefficients represent the level of impact that each independent variable has on the 
dependent variable (dividend payout ratio). The independent variable and conh·ol 
variables were transformed into their log form because it made substansive sense so as 
to fit the model best. 
D.LNDPOUT Coef Std. Err. t P>ltl 95% Conf Interval 
INSTD1 -0.7004953 1.078158 -0.65 0.518 -2 .851926 1.450935 
MGRLD1 -0.2978744 1.93086 -0.15 0.878 -4.150845 3.555096 
FRGND1 -1.581865 1.349038 -1.17 0.245 -4.273828 1.110097 
GOVTD1 0.05763071 0.4940408 1.17 0.247 -0.409536 1.56215 
OTHER D1 0.4077434 1.0906 0.37 0.710 -1.768515 2.584002 
LnROE D1 0.7811386 0.3521436 2.22 0.030 0.078447 1.48383 
LnBV D1 0.0019828 0.1541269 0.01 0.990 -0.3055726 0.3095382 
24 
LnROC D1 -0.1776962 0.2310915 -0.77 0.445 -0.6388321 0.2834397 
LnGR D1 -0.7778022 0.1410992 -5.51 0.000 -1.059361 -0.4962432 
Ln ROA D1 0.3538276 0.2850201 1.24 0.219 -0.2149212 0.9225764 
Table 4.4 
Inferences 
The results obtained were scrutinized against the previously formed working hypothesis. 
Institutional ownership 
A unit change in institutional ownership will change dividend payout ratio by -0.7004953. 
Thus we reject the null hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and dividend payout of banks. 
Managerial Ownership 
A unit change in managerial ownership will change dividend payout ratio by -0.2978744. 
Thus we accept the null hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and dividend payout of listed banks. 
Foreign Ownership 
A unit change in foreign ownership will change dividend payout ratio by -1.581865. Thus 
we accept the null hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between foreign 
ownership and dividend payout of listed banks. 
Government ownership 
A unit change in government ownership will decrease dividend payout ratio by 
0.05763071. Thus we accept the null hypothesis that there is a positive relationship 
between government ownership and dividend payout of banks. 
Other ownership 
A unit change in other ownership will change dividend payout ratio by 0.4077434. Thus 
we accept the null hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between other 
relationship and dividend payout of banks. 
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of the ownership structure on dividend 
policy of listed banks in Kenya. In order to achieve this, a panel data analysis was carried 
out on a sample of eleven of the twelve listed banks in Kenya. Evidence from the first 
order regressions reveal government and 'other' to be the ownership type to have the 
strongest positive influence on dividend payout ratio. Meanwhile, institutional, foreign 
and corporate ownership types exhibit a negative relationship with dividend payout 
ratio. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that price to book value and return on asset have a 
positive impact on the dividend payout ratio of the firms in the study. The results also 
suggest a sh·ong positive relationship between return on equity and dividend payout 
ratio, while an inverse relationship with growth rate and return on capital is proven. 
One feasible explanation for the findings is the' substitute model', in which dividends are 
the substitute for legal protection of outsiders, and are paid to establish reputations of 
good treatment of external shareholders. According to the 'substitute model', insiders 
interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for 
decent treatment of minority shareholders. 
Most banks that are government run aim to form cordial relationships and improve the 
standard of living for their shareholders. Issuing dividends is an effective way of 
achieving this. In turn, banking stocks become very attractive to investors looking to 
diversify their portfolios. However, foreign and institutionally run banks are more profit 
driven; therefore, they will reinvest their revenues into capital generating projects. 
Further research is needed to test whether the 11substitute model 11 and reputation effect 
can actually explain the dividend policy of Kenyan listed firms. 
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RECOMENDATION 
There are conflicting theories and opinions in the community of finance researchers on 
the topic of dividend policy and ownership structure. Contradicting schools argue on one 
hand that dividend policies are irrelevant for the value of firms, while other schools argue 
on the other hand that they are relevant. Previous research on the topic conducted in 
different geographical settings have yielded different results, but nearly all of them have 
been conducted in advanced economies. This study is one of the first to be conducted in 
the setting of a developed economy. 
This paper has therefore added knowledge to the field of dividend policy and ownership 
structure by adding another piece of the puzzle of dividend policies: how ownership 
structure impacts upon divend policy by using dividend policy as a proxy. The results 
from this paper can be used for further studies, partly as a theoretical base when 
comparing other countries but also for future studies which may seek to explain the 
differences between the relationships of ownership structure and dividend policy in 
different geographical settings. They results may also be used as a predictor of dividend 
policies of firms with a high concentration of institutional ownership in geographical 
settings similar to Kenya. This information could be useful for managers of firms who 
want to attract a certain kind of investors by utilizing dividend policy as a means of doing 
so. Furthermore, this study has provided support for the theory that dividends are 
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